This paper develops a structural model of newspaper markets to analyze the effects of ownership consolidation, taking into account not only firms' price adjustments but also the adjustments in newspaper characteristics. A new data set on newspaper prices and characteristics is used to estimate the model. The paper then simulates the effect of a merger in the Minneapolis newspaper market and studies how welfare effects of mergers vary with market characteristics.
Introduction
Do mergers affect product characteristics? Standard merger analyses typically study price effects only and ignore changes in product characteristics. This paper endogenizes both. It is likely that firms would adjust the features of their products after a merger. Ignoring this aspect of firm decisions in a merger analysis can lead to a bias in estimated welfare effects. Specifically, I study how ownership consolidation affects product characteristics and welfare in the U.S. daily newspaper market. The newspaper market provides an ideal environment for analyzing the effect of mergers on product features for both econometric and economic reasons. First of all, individual newspapers often circulate in local markets. There is substantial variation in demographics and ownership structure across these markets. This variation is crucial for this study. Secondly, the characteristics of newspapers are obviously important for welfare. For example, after an ownership consolidation, do newspaper publishers improve or deteriorate the content quality? Do they enlarge or shrink the local news ratio? Do they increase or decrease content variety?
To address these questions, I set up a structural model of the U.S. daily newspaper market that describes the demand for newspapers, the demand for advertising and publishers' decisions. The model is estimated using a new data set that I have compiled from various data sources, which includes information on newspaper characteristics, subscription prices, advertising rates, circulation and advertising quantity for U.S. daily newspapers between 1997 and 2005.
Based on the estimates of the model parameters, I simulate the effects of an ownership consolidation of two newspapers in the Minneapolis market that was blocked by the Department of Justice. The simulation results show that if the merger had occurred, both newspapers would have decreased the news content quality, the local news ratio and the content variety. These changes in the newspaper characteristics would have been accompanied by a rise in both newspapers' subscription price. Overall, circulation would have declined and the local news content read per household would have decreased by 10.75%. Reader surplus would have decreased by 3.28 million dollars and publisher surplus would have increased by 4.32 million dollars. The simulation also indicates that ignoring characteristic adjustment leads to an underestimation of the loss for readers by 1.05 million dollars and the gain for publishers by 0.10 million dollars.
The above case study shows how the framework provided in the paper can be used to analyze the effect of ownership consolidation for a specific market. Such a study can be computationally involved. To provide some general guidance, I therefore study in a more reduced-form way what aspects of market characteristics are important for the welfare analysis of ownership consolidation.
I use the distribution of the welfare effects across markets to examine the correlation between the welfare effect of ownership consolidation and the underlying market structure. To this end, I
quantify the welfare implications of ownership consolidation in all duopoly markets and triopoly markets in the last year of my sample. I find that readers' welfare loss is positively correlated with how much they value newspapers in general and with how important the common circulation area of the two merged parties is to these two newspapers. Readers' welfare loss is negatively correlated with the asymmetry of newspaper size measured by pre-merger circulation levels. This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First and foremost, it is part of the literature on mergers. One group of papers in this literature analyzes outcomes of actual mergers in the data. Examples include Borenstein (1990) , Berry and Waldfogel (2001) , Focarelli and Panetta (2003) , George (2007) as well as Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) . Another group of papers takes a more structural approach and very often quantifies the welfare effects of mergers. These papers typically study the effect of mergers on prices and welfare effects through price changes only.
Examples include Baker and Baresnahan (1985) , Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) , Werden and Froeb (1994) , Nevo (2000) , Town (2001) and Ivaldi and McCullough (2010) . This paper is part of the second group and adds to this literature by showing that ignoring characteristic adjustment can be a serious omission when investigating the welfare effect of a merger.
Second, this paper also contributes to the emerging literature on endogenous product choice, examples of which include Mazzeo (2002) , Crawford and Shum (2006) as well as Draganska, Mazzeo and Seim (2009) . 1 The latter also studies the effect of mergers. Endogenizing product choice typically introduces important computational challenges. Papers in the literature either directly specify a profit function that is not derived from demand (such as Mazzeo (2002) ) or focus on monopoly industries (such as Crawford and Shum (2006) ), or examine markets with a naturally finite and discrete product choice set (such as Draganska, Mazzeo and Seim (2009) ). This paper builds an oligopoly model where the profit function is derived from underlying demand and the product characteristics are continuous. I overcome the computational burden by using an estimation strategy similar to that in Villas-Boas (2007) . Endogenizing product characteristics also invalidates the typical instrumental variables used in the literature of estimating demand with differentiated products. For example, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) use the characteristics of competitors' products, which are considered endogenous in this paper. To overcome this problem, I exploit a key feature of the newspaper industry: it is typical that the circulation area of a newspaper overlaps with other newspapers' circulation areas, but only partially so. This allows me to use the demographics (demand shifters) in non-overlapping markets of a newspaper's competitors as instruments. Even though these demographics do not directly enter the newspaper's own demand curve, they affect its choice of characteristics through competitive effects.
Finally, this paper is also related to an empirical literature on newspapers. Examples in this literature include Rosse (1967) , Ferguson (1983) , Genesove (1999) , George (2007), Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) , Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) , Chiang and Knight (2011) as well as Schulhofer-Wohl and Garrido (2012) . George (2007) is the most closely related to this paper as she also studies market structure and product differentiation in the newspaper industry. She regresses measures of product variety on ownership concentration and finds a positive correlation between them. Since the concept of market structure is difficult to capture by a simple index, in this paper I model it explicitly. Moreover, a structural approach allows me to calculate the welfare effect of a merger.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structural model of newspaper markets and derives estimating equations. The data are described in Section 3. Section 4 explains the estimation approach and reports the estimation results. Section 5 contains two subsections, where I study the effect of a counterfactual ownership consolidation in the Minneapolis market and quantify the welfare implications of ownership consolidation in duopoly and triopoly markets. This latter section also studies the correlation between the welfare effects of ownership consolidation and the underlying market structure. Section 6 concludes.
The Model

Demand
Newspaper profit comes from both selling newspapers to readers and selling advertising space to advertisers. In this section, I describe the demand for newspapers and the demand for advertising.
Since my data on newspaper circulation are at the county level, I start with the county demand for newspapers, which is derived from the aggregation of heterogeneous households' multiple discrete choices. A multiple discrete choice model is necessary to explain duplicate readership. For example, in 275 county/years in the data, the total circulation of all newspapers is even larger than the number of households. 2,3 I assume that a household in the model buys no more than two newspapers. The model is based on Hendel (1999) , and I augment it in two ways. First, I allow for decreased utility from the second choice. Second, I ensure that a household in the model buys no more than one copy of a newspaper.
Specifically, suppose all households in a county face the same choice set and the number of daily newspapers available in county c in year t is J ct . A household i in this county gets utility u ijct from subscribing to newspaper j in year t and utility u i0ct from an outside choice. 4 The probability that household i subscribes to newspaper j is the sum of the probability that j is the first choice and the probability that j is the second choice:
where the inequality u ij ct ≥ u ijct ≥ max h =j u ihct in the second term ensures that j is the first best and j is the second best; and κ is a parameter that captures the diminishing utility from subscribing to a second newspaper.
I assume that a household derives utility from the characteristics of a newspaper and that this utility is also affected by county-specific factors and individual-specific tastes. The conditional indirect utility of household i in county c from subscribing to newspaper j in year t is assumed to be
where p jt is the annual subscription price, and x jt is a 3-dimensional vector of the endogenous newspaper characteristics chosen by the newspaper publishers. They are a news content quality 2 The average newspaper penetration (total newspaper circulation in a county divided by the number of households in the county) of these 275 county/years is 1.13. To investigate whether measurement errors could be the explanation for the existence of such county/years, I plotted the histogram of the county-level newspaper penetration. The distribution of the penetration seems continuous. For example, there are more than 275 county/years with the newspaper penetration larger than 95% and even more with the penetration larger than 90%. While it is not a proof that measurement errors are not the explanation, the continuous distribution rules out the case where the newspaper penetration in all county/years except these 275 is smaller than, for example, 90%. Such a data pattern would suggest that it is due to measurement error that we observe 275 county/years with the newspaper penetration larger than 100%. Moreover, the newspaper penetration is indeed positively correlated with the number of newspapers. 3 I could have used a single discrete choice model with an inflated number of households as the market size (for example, population in a county). But the number of households is the measure for market size used in the newspaper literature because newspapers are non-exclusive products that can be shared by all members in a household. It is also the market size used in the newspaper industry. For example, the Audit Bureau of Circulations, my data source for circulation, uses the number of households in a county as the market size for computing county penetration. A multiple discrete choice model, which does not complicate the model much, therefore describes the industry better. 4 Utility actually varies across i, j, t. The subscript c is redundant in uijct, as each household can be in only one county. I add the subscript c to emphasize that utility is affected by some county-specific tastes, which are operationalized in the estimation by county-level demographics.
index, the local news ratio and a measure of content variety. The first endogenous newspaper characteristic, the news content quality index, depends on the so-called news hole (non-advertising space, denoted x 11jt ), the number of staff for opinion sections (x 12jt ), and the number of reporters (x 13jt ):
The second characteristic, the local news ratio, captures a newspaper's emphasis on local news and is proxied by the percentage of local-news staff over the total number of staff. The third characteristic, variety, is measured by 100 1 − i (share of staff in section i) 2 . It is decreasing in the concentration measure, i (share of staff in section i) 2 , which is analogous to the HerfindahlHirschman Index for industry concentration.
The vector y jct includes the newspaper characteristics that are assumed to be exogenous in the model because they rarely change over time. For example, the location of a newspaper's headquarters determines the distance between the centroid of county c and newspaper j's home county centroid. The distance is included in y jct to capture readers' taste for local newspapers.
The vector z ct , which includes demographics of county c, captures county/year-specific tastes for newspapers. This vector also includes a constant term.
The term ξ jct is the unobservable county/year-specific taste for newspaper j. It captures a county-specific taste that is not captured by z ct . It also captures characteristics of the newspaper that are relevant for readers but unobservable to the econometrician and therefore not included in
The stochastic term ε ijt is i.i.d. and follows the Type I extreme value distribution. It represents unobservable household-specific tastes. Household heterogeneity in tastes for newspaper characteristics is captured by the random coefficient β kict = β k + z ct θ k + σ k ς kict , which is household i's specific taste for the k th endogenous characteristic. 5 I assume that ς kict is identically and independently distributed across characteristics and households, and follows the standard normal distribution. This allows the characteristic to be horizontal. For example, some consumers might prefer higher local content ratio, and some might prefer lower.
Instead of treating the utility from the outside choice as fixed, I model it as a time trend to capture changes due to the development of online news sources during the sample period. Specifically, 5 Consumer heterogeneity in price sensitivity is very small and statistically insignificant according to the estimation of a more general model.
I assume that the utility from the outside choice is
where t 0 is the first year in the data and ρ is a parameter to be estimated.
The market penetration 6 of newspaper j in county c is the aggregation of households' newspaper choices in the county. The aggregation is similar to that in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (henceforth, BLP). Define the "relative" county mean utility, δ jct , as the difference between the mean utility in county c from newspaper j and the mean utility of the outside choice:
Then county market penetration can be expressed as a function of δ ct = (δ jct , j = 1, ..., J ct ) and
See Appendix C for the expression of the county penetration function s j .
Following BLP, I do not use the market penetration equation in the estimation directly, but invert it to obtain the relative mean utility for estimation. I show in Appendix C that the BLP invertibility result holds for the multiple discrete choice model in this paper under two conditions. Furthermore, the contraction mapping defined in BLP is still valid, leading to a simple algorithm to solve for δ ct . The two conditions are (i) 0 < s jt < 1 for ∀j = 1, ..., J ct and (ii) Jct j=1 s jt < 2. These two assumptions are quite mild. Assumption (i) means that there is always some household choosing newspaper j and some household not choosing it. Assumption (ii) means that there is always some household choosing to purchase fewer than two newspapers. Under these two conditions, the solution to s jct = s j (δ ct , x ct ; σ, κ) is unique. Denote this solution by δ ct (s ct ; σ, κ). 7 Therefore, for the true value of the parameters,
This is the first estimation equation. To conclude the description of the demand for newspaper j, let H ct be the number of households in county c in year t. The demand for newspaper j, i.e., the total circulation of newspaper j, is then the sum of the circulation in all counties covered by newspaper j (denoted by C jt ):
6 This is typically called "market share" in a single discrete choice model. But in a multiple discrete choice model, the sum of "market shares" can be larger than 1. "Market penetration" is therefore a better term and is used by the Audit Bureau of Circulations. 7 The solution depends on xct as well as sct. The subscript ct is added to δ to recognize this dependence.
The demand for advertising is modeled as in Rysman (2004):
where r jt and q jt are newspaper j's advertising rate in column inches and total circulation. 8 H jt is the number of households in newspaper j's circulation area, which shifts the demand for advertising.
Let ι jt be an i.i.d. and mean zero measurement error for advertising linage (the advertising quantity measured in column inches); then the second estimation equation is log a jt = η + λ 0 log H jt + λ 1 log q jt + λ 2 log r jt + ι jt .
Supply
The term "market" is typically used to describe either a set of competing firms or a set of available products. This implies that a market is a geographic area that satisfies two criteria: (i) all consumers in the area face the same choice set and (ii) the suppliers of these choices in the area compete with each other and with no one else. In the daily newspaper industry, however, there is no geographic area satisfying both criteria because circulation areas of newspapers partially overlap. In that sense, all newspapers in the U.S. are potentially competing, which makes the model intractable.
To limit the number of players in a game, I make three assumptions.
8 Note that in this specification circulation affects advertising demand. What about the other direction? In an auxiliary estimation of the demand for newspapers where I allow advertising quantity to affect consumers' utility, I find that the effect of advertising linage on consumers' utility is negative, very small and statistically insignificant. Therefore, I have assumed that readers only care about the news hole and not about advertising. 9 Few newspapers have different subscription prices for households outside the home county or the home state. In 2005, for example, less than 30 newspapers among more than 1400 newspapers charge different prices according to the subscriber's location. For these newspapers, I use the local price and ignore price discrimination. Also note that newspaper characteristics studied in this paper are the same no matter where the subscriber of the newspaper is. Details on economies of scope are described later in this section.
These three assumptions limit the number of players in a game. I now describe the game that models the supply side. In the game, all player publishers 10 choose the characteristics of their newspapers in the first stage and newspaper prices and advertising rates in the second stage. The 10 Under the assumptions above, there might be newspapers that circulate in the market of the players but are not competing with them. They are called "non-players" in this game. For example, the three national newspapers are non-players. Since non-players in a game are assumed not to compete with the player newspapers, their characteristics and prices are taken as given in the game.
ownership and circulation area of each newspaper are assumed to be determined before the start of the game and are considered exogenous. In the remainder of this section, the subscript t is suppressed for ease of exposition. It is only restored in the statement of the estimation equations.
Suppose the fixed cost of choosing a certain combination of newspaper characteristics is given by f c (x j , ν j ; τ ), where x j stands for the characteristics, ν j represents the unobservable cost shocks and τ is a vector of parameters. This cost is fixed with respect to circulation and advertising. Then the profit function that is relevant for the first-stage decision is
where π II j (p, r; x) is the variable profit from circulation and advertising, and p * j (x) and r * j (x) are equilibrium newspaper prices and advertising rates. In fact, the equilibrium prices also depend on other variables such as county demographics. They are omitted for presentational simplicity. The variable profit π II j is the sum of circulation profit, display advertising profit and preprint profit. I now specify each of the three components.
Circulation profit is the difference between circulation revenue determined by the demand for newspapers described in Section 2.1 and the variable cost of printing and delivery. This cost varies with circulation and at the margin depends on publication frequency and the number of pages.
To capture potential economies of scale and economies of scope in printing and delivery, I allow average costs to depend on the total circulation of all newspapers that circulate in the neighboring area of newspaper j (defined by whether their home counties are in the same MSA) and are owned by j's publisher. This total circulation is denoted by Q j . Specifically, Q j = q j when j's publisher owns only one newspaper (i.e., newspaper j) or when the home counties of its other newspapers are not in the same MSA as that of j. Otherwise, Q j is the total circulation of all of its newspapers whose home counties are in the same MSA as that of newspaper j. To summarize, I assume that the average cost is
where f j is the publication frequency measured by the number of issues per year, (x 1j + a j ) is the annual pages, i.e., the sum of annual non-advertising space in pages and annual display advertising linage, and ω j is an unobservable factor that determines the average cost.
The advertising demand described in Section 2.1 is really demand for display advertising, which is printed on the newspapers' pages along with the news. There exists another type of advertisement, namely preprints, which is inserted into copies of a newspaper and distributed along with them. This is essentially a delivery service provided by newspapers. I do not observe the advertising rate for preprints. Therefore, I do not derive the preprint profit from a demand model. Instead, I
assume that it is a simple quadratic function of circulation:
Display advertising profit, on the other hand, is derived from the advertising demand model.
Display advertising involves two costs. One is the cost of printing, which is captured by the cost varying with circulation as explained above. The other cost is the marginal advertising sales cost, which I assume is
where λ 2 is the price elasticity of demand for display advertising, as defined in (7), 11 and ζ j is a mean-zero exogenous random variable. Then the display advertising profit is given by
Note that the main arguments offered for ownership consolidation revolve around the concepts of synergies in printing and in the delivery of newspapers. There is rarely a similar discussion on synergies for the advertising sales component. I therefore assume a constant marginal advertising sales cost while allowing the average cost of circulation to vary with total circulation.
In summary, the variable profit is given by the sum of circulation profit, display advertising profit and preprint profit:
As defined in equation (9), profit is the difference between the variable profit and the fixed cost.
The fixed cost captures the cost of choosing a specific product characteristic that is independent of circulation and advertising quantity. For instance, increasing the quality of a newspaper increases the cost of publishing the newspaper, but not the cost of having one additional subscriber. The latter cost mainly consists of the printing and delivery costs. I use a quadratic function to approximate the fixed cost function. Specifically, I assume that the slope of the fixed cost f c (x j , ν j ; τ )
11 Becauseζ is a parameter to be estimated, (1 + 1/λ2) is just a normalization used to make the optimal display advertising rate condition (16) simple.
with respect to the k th endogenous characteristic x kj is 12
The demand for newspapers and display advertising described in Section 2.1 are both annual, i.e., they describe annual subscribers and annual advertising linage. The costs modeled in this section are therefore annual costs.
Finally, I observe Joint Operation Agreements (JOA) in the data. Newspapers under a JOA combine business operations while maintaining separate and competitive editorial operations. For business operations, the two newspapers under a JOA either form a third company or one of them acts as the operating partner for the other. Therefore, in the model, I assume that the operating party -either the third party or the operating publisher -chooses newspaper subscription prices and advertising rates for both newspapers in the second stage to maximize the joint profit for given newspaper characteristics. In the first stage, the two publishers choose the characteristics of their respective newspapers separately. Since I do not observe how the profit is split between the two newspapers, I assume that each newspaper publisher gets the profit from its own newspaper.
Necessary Equilibrium Conditions
I now derive the optimality conditions for prices, advertising rates and newspaper characteristics. 13 Similar to Rosse (1967) , these optimality conditions will be used to identify the cost structure of newspaper production.
A newspaper publisher makes a 2-dimensional pricing decision: it must select the subscription price and the display advertising rate for each newspaper it owns. Taking the derivative of the second-stage profit function π II j in (14) with respect to the advertising rate r j yields the optimal 12 The slope of the fixed cost could depend on the characteristics of other newspapers owned by the same publisher if there are economies of scope in the production of quality. I have estimated two models allowing economies of scope in quality production. In one model, I inflate the quality characteristics of newspaper j by (1 + γ 0 mj) in the utility function, where mj is the number of newspapers owned by newspaper j's publisher. A significant and positive estimate of γ 0 would indicate that a certain number of reporters, for example, can generate higher quality when the publisher owns multiple newspapers. This would be evidence of economies of scope in producing quality. In the other model, economies of scope in providing quality are captured by multiplying the cost of providing quality by m γ 0 j . A significant and negative estimate of γ 0 would indicate economies of scope in producing quality. The estimation of both models yields very small and statistically insignificant estimates of γ 0 .
The slope of the fixed cost could also depend on competitors' characteristics if newspaper publishers are imperfectly competing in input markets. In this paper, I take a partial equilibrium approach and assume that the input price is fixed. Thus, the slope of the fixed costs is independent of competitors' characteristics.
13 Following the literature, I assume that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Finding a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium is beyond the scope of this paper.
display advertising rate as a function of circulation:
To derive the first-order condition with respect to the subscription price, define a matrix ∆ whose (h, j) element is given by
, if h and j have the same publisher; 0, otherwise.
Similarly, I define the matrix Γ, which captures economies of scale and scope, as
, if h and j have the same publisher & their home counties are in one MSA; 0, otherwise.
Also, I define Λ as a vector of the effect of circulation on display advertising profit:
where λ 2 is the price elasticity of display advertising demand.
Then the first-order condition with respect to the subscription price can be expressed in matrix form as
The difference between this first-order condition and a standard first-order condition lies in the second term ([Λ + (µ 1 + µ 2 q)]), which captures the effect of circulation on total advertising profit, and the third term (Γq), which captures economies of scale and scope in printing and delivering newspapers.
In the first stage, publishers choose newspaper characteristics. The necessary optimality condition for the k th characteristic is
where J mt is the set of newspapers of j's publisher m in year t and J g(jt) represents the set of all player newspapers in the game that jt belongs to. The first term on the left hand side is the direct impact of increasing the k th characteristic of newspaper j on the variable profit of newspaper h owned by the same publisher. A change in x kjt also has an indirect effect on the variable profit of newspaper h through an impact on the equilibrium subscription prices for all newspapers in the game. This indirect effect is captured by the second term. The data set also contains information on newspaper characteristics. A newspaper is described by the following attributes: the news hole, the number of opinion section staff, the number of reporters, the local news ratio, variety, the frequency of publication, and edition (morning or evening newspaper). Direct data on the news hole is not available. News hole is the difference between the annual number of pages and the annual advertising quantity. The former (n j ) is observable in the data. The latter is computed from the advertising demand function as specified in equation (7), which depends on observable variables and model parameters. 16 The number of reporters in this study is measured by the number of reporters weighted by the inverse of the number of titles that each reporter has. For example, if a reporter also holds 14 Moreover, this approach can only be used for continuous characteristics. Note that the newspaper characteristics studied in this paper can reasonably be considered continuous. As will be explained in Section 3, I measure the number of reporters, for example, by the number of reporters weighted by the inverse of the number of titles that each reporter has. 15 I assume that the data are missing at random. 16 The news hole for newspaper j in year t is njt − a (rjt, qjt, Hjt; η, λ) whether the advertising linage data is available for this newspaper/year or not. This is because I am concerned that the observed advertising linage includes a measurement error.
some managing job, this reporter contributes 1/2 to the number of reporters. The number of staff for each section is similarly defined. I then compute the share of staff for each of the following sections: "business & financial", "computers & technology", "editorial/opinion page", "entertainment & art", "features & lifestyle", "local news", "national & international news", "science & medicine" and "sports". As explained in Section 2.1, these shares are used to measure "variety" as 100 1 − i (share of staff in section i) 2 .
Appendix A provides a detailed explanation of the data sources and the variable definitions.
Missing data on price or pages per issue lead to the deletion of all newspapers interacting with a newspaper with missing information on price or pages. 17 I also delete games involving large counties because it is not clear whether two newspapers in a large county compete directly with each other. Specifically, I consider a county "large" if the number of households in this county is larger than 100,000 and the land area is larger than 1000 square miles according to the 2000
Census. 49 counties fall into this category.
In the end, there are 5843 newspaper/years in the sample. These newspaper/years' markets consist of 8947 county/years. Summary statistics for the main variables for the final sample are provided in Tables 1 and 2 . 
Estimation
Five estimation equations are taken to the data: (5), (8), (16), (17) and (18). They are, respectively, derived from newspaper demand, advertising demand and the first-order conditions with respect to advertising rate, subscription price and newspaper characteristics.
The parameters to be estimated include (i) the parameters in the newspaper demand function;
(ii) the parameters in the display advertising demand function; (iii) the cost parameters; and (iv) the parameters in the preprint profit function.
The identification of newspaper demand parameters is similar to the identification of analogous parameters in BLP. However, unlike BLP, product characteristics are endogenous in this paper. As will be explained in Section 4.1, I therefore use a different source of exogenous variation to identify the effects of product characteristics and prices.
Among other parameters, the identification of the diminishing utility parameter κ needs an explanation. Identification of κ comes from the variation in the number of newspapers in a county.
In counties with only one newspaper, diminishing utility does not play a role in determining market penetration. Suppose all parameters were identified using the data from such counties only.
Then, based on these estimates, market penetration in counties with multiple newspapers could be computed assuming that each household chooses at most one newspaper. The difference between the observed data and these counterfactual market penetrations assuming a single choice is then explained by the choice of a second newspaper, the probability of which is influenced by κ. 18
18 This identification relies on the exogeneity of newspapers' circulation area. As I have explained in Section 2, the circulation area of each newspaper is assumed to be determined before the start of the game and is considered exogenous.
Instruments
In the model, newspaper publishers know the unobservable (to econometricians) newspapercounty specific taste ξ jct and the unobservable cost shocks ζ jt , ω jt , ν jt before they choose the characteristics, the subscription prices and the advertising rates of their newspapers. These choices are therefore likely to be correlated with the unobservables. Instrumental variables are used to deal with this endogeneity. Specifically, I use the demographics in the market of j's competitors (excluding j's own market) as instruments.
The intuition for why the demographics in the competitors' market can be used as instruments is illustrated in Figure 2 . The demographics in county 2 influence the demand for newspaper B demographics, when making a decision on product characteristics and prices. The demographics of competitors' markets therefore can be used as instruments. The underlying assumption in BLP is that the product characteristics are exogenous. The underlying assumption here is that the entry/location choices are exogenous. This is plausible because location decisions are typically of a longer horizon than both characteristic and price decisions.
In summary, the partial overlapping feature of the industry allows the demographics in competitors' markets to be used as instruments, specifically, the excluded instruments. The included instruments include the demographics of a newspaper's own market. Table 3 reports the correlation between the included and the excluded instruments. Specifically, it reports the correlation between the mean educational level, for example, in the market of a newspaper and the mean of the educational levels in the counties that belong to its competitors' markets but are not in its own market. This table shows that the demographics of neighboring counties are not highly correlated,
i.e., the included instruments and the excluded instruments are not highly correlated. Note that among the demographic measures only the number of households in a county varies across years. This is because the data on the number of households come from the yearly County Penetration Report by the Audit Bureau of Circulations while the county-level demographics data come from Census and yearly data are not available. So the main variation is cross-sectional. The exogenous sources of variation that lead to changes in prices and newspaper characteristics over time include the variation in market structure such as ownership and the time trend.
Estimation Results
The parameters are estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments. See Appendix D for the list of instrumental variables used in this study. Appendix E provides details on the GMM estimation. Estimation results are presented in Table 4 . The reported standard errors are robust to correlation for the same newspaper across counties and across years. As explained in Section 2.2, I define the market of the newspaper as the set of counties that covers at least 85 percent of total circulation. Estimation results when 80% of total circulation is used as the criterion are reported in Appendix F. The results are quite close.
The endogenous newspaper characteristics include the news content quality index (x 1 ), the local news ratio (x 2 ) and variety (x 3 ). The news content quality index depends on the news hole, the number of staff for opinion sections and the number of reporters according to equation (3).
I normalize the weight on the news hole to be 1. The news hole, the non-advertising space, is Specifically, I allow a consumer's taste to depend on the education level and the median age of the county she resides in and a consumer-specific random term. 19 The estimates indicate that more educated and older people are more interested in local content. For an average household in a county with the average educational level and average median age, a decrease in the local news ratio by 0.1 is equivalent to an increase in the annual subscription price by 19 cents. 20 Since a household's taste depends on the demographics of the county she resides in and a consumer-specific random term, this equivalent decrease in the annual subscription price varies across households.
The standard deviation is 5 dollars.
The exogenous characteristics include the number of households in the market of a newspaper, whether the newspaper is a morning newspaper or an evening newspaper, whether a county is its home county and the distance between the county and its home county. The corresponding parameters are ψ 1 to ψ 4 . The negative sign of ψ 1 indicates that readers value a newspaper with, for example, 10 reporters covering a small region more than they do a newspaper that has 10 reporters and serves a large area. The estimates also show that readers prefer morning newspapers (see the estimate of ψ 2 ). Readers' taste for local newspapers is captured by the distance between the centroid of county c and the centroid of newspaper j's home county. A local dummy, i.e., whether the distance is 0, is also included to allow readers' taste to be nonlinear in the distance.
The estimates of ψ 3 and ψ 4 indicate that readers value newspapers whose home counties are close and have a particular taste for local newspapers.
County demographics used in this paper include educational level, median income, median age and urbanization, all of which positively affect the demand for newspapers except median income.
The positive sign of ρ indicates that readers' utility from subscribing to a newspaper decreases over time. This is consistent with the advent of online news, which motivates the inclusion of the time trend in the model.
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The estimates for a model where a consumer's taste for the local news ratio also depends on median income and urbanization indicate that its dependency on these demographics is not significant. 20 The standard deviation of the local news ratio is 0.1.
The parameter κ measures the diminished utility of subscribing to a second newspaper. In a single discrete choice model, this parameter is essentially set to infinity so that consumers buy at most one product. The estimate of κ in the present multiple discrete choice model is 1.919. It implies that in 3480 out of 7696 county/years with multiple newspapers, less than 1% of newspaper subscribers purchase two newspapers. In other words, duplicate readership is negligible in about 45% of the county/years with multiple newspapers. In the 731 county/years with more than 5%
newspaper subscribers purchasing two newspapers, on average 9.41% of the subscribers do so.
All parameters in the advertising demand function have the expected signs: the display advertising demand is increasing in the market size and circulation; it is decreasing in advertising rate. The price elasticity of display advertising demand is close to -1. The circulation elasticity of display advertising demand, however, is larger than 1. As will be explained in the next section, this has an important implication for how publishers adjust the characteristics and the prices of their newspapers after a market structure change.
The negative sign of the estimate of γ 4 is consistent with synergies in printing and delivery. For example, when two newspapers with the same pre-merger circulation level and the same publication frequency and number of pages merge, the cost saving is 27% of the pre-merger printing/delivery cost if the post-merger total circulation is simply the sum of the pre-merger circulation. If the post-merger total circulation is 75% of the total pre-merger circulation, the cost synergy is 17%.
Counterfactual Simulations
This section contains two subsections. Section 5.1 studies an ownership consolidation of two newspapers in the Minneapolis market that was blocked by the Department of Justice. Section 5.2 studies the welfare effects of mergers in all duopoly and triopoly markets in the 2005 sample and examines the general pattern of how the welfare effect of a merger varies with market characteristics. Throughout this section, I use "ownership consolidation" and "merger" interchangeably. The equilibrium in the counterfactual simulations is computed using best-response iteration.
A brief discussion of welfare measures is in order (details can be found in Appendix B). The welfare effect on readers is measured by compensating variation similar to that in Small and Rosen (1981) . Publisher surplus is given by the profit function in (9). Advertiser surplus, however, cannot be estimated. Since I observe only the advertising linage for newspapers instead of each advertiser's individual behavior, only the price elasticity of the market demand for advertising is identified. Due to the potential externality of aggregate advertising on the effectiveness of individual advertising, the market demand does not correspond to an individual agent's willingness to pay. Thus there is not enough information in the data to measure advertiser surplus. However, as shown in Appendix B, there is enough information to compute the percentage change of advertiser surplus after an ownership consolidation. I denote these three welfare measures by RS (for reader surplus), AS (for advertiser surplus) and P S (for publisher surplus).
A Case Study for the Minneapolis/St. Paul Metropolitan Area
In 2006 smaller party to the merger (the Pioneer ) is much larger than that of the larger party (the Star ). As explained in Section 4.2, the model estimates indicate that the advertising profit function is convex in circulation, implying that the marginal value of circulation is higher for larger newspapers.
Therefore, a multi-newspaper publisher has an incentive to shift circulation from its small to its large newspapers. Here, McClatchy, who owns both the Star and the Pioneer after the ownership consolidation, adjusts the price of the smaller newspaper by a bigger margin due to this incentive.
Overall, the circulation of the Star will decrease by 7189 and that of the Pioneer by 11345. The decline in circulation shifts the advertising demand curve to the left, which explains the decrease in the advertising rate for both newspapers.
In Table 5 (b), I allow adjustments in both prices and product characteristics. According to the simulation, McClatchy will decrease the content quality for both newspapers by 2% for the Star and 11% for the Pioneer. The same intuition for the asymmetric adjustment in prices in Table 5 The welfare effect of the ownership consolidation of the Star and the Pioneer is reported in Table 6 . Overall, reader surplus declines by 3.28 million dollars (6.87% of the pre-merger reader 21 For each newspaper in this market, I use the data to compute its pre-merger local news content (local news ratio×news hole) and its pre-merger penetration in the market (per-merger circulation/households in the market). I then compute the product of these two terms for each newspaper and sum over these products across all newspaper in the market. This gives the pre-merger "local news content read per household" in the market. I also compute the post-merger "local news content read per household" based on the simulated result and then compare the two.
surplus) and publisher surplus increases by 4.32 million dollars (37.25% of the pre-merger publisher surplus). As explained at the beginning of Section 5, there is only enough information to measure the percentage change of advertiser surplus. In this study, advertiser surplus declines by 7.10%. To understand how the effect of characteristic adjustment compares to the effect of price adjustment, I decompose the reader surplus change into ("reader surplus with post-merger prices and postmerger characteristics"−"reader surplus with post-merger prices and pre-merger characteristics") and ("reader surplus with post-merger prices and pre-merger characteristics"−"reader surplus with pre-merger prices and pre-merger characteristics"). These two parts of the reader surplus change represent, respectively, the effect of characteristics and the effect of prices on consumers. They are -1.31 million dollars and -1.96 million dollars. 22 The decomposition suggests that the price adjustments have a larger impact on consumers than the characteristic adjustments. But the latter are not negligible. They still account for 40% of the total reader surplus change. One can also see the effect of characteristic adjustment by comparing the welfare effects of ownership consolidation with and without characteristic adjustment. Table 6 shows that the welfare change without characteristic adjustment is -2.22 million dollars for readers, -4.23% for advertisers and 4.06 million dollars for publishers. Therefore, ignoring characteristic adjustment leads to an underestimate of the welfare loss for readers by 1.05 million dollars, the welfare loss for advertisers by 1.86%, and the increase in publisher surplus by 0.10 million dollars. The general relationship between the bias in estimating the welfare effect from ignoring characteristic adjustment and the underlying market structure is analyzed in Section 5.2.
Welfare Analysis of Duopoly and Triopoly Mergers
The welfare effects of ownership consolidation in a market depend on the details of the market structure. The previous section shows how the framework in this paper can be used to study ownership consolidation in one specific market. I now investigate the general pattern of how the welfare effect of a merger varies with market characteristics. The results of this investigation can be used to guide competition policy. To this end, I study the welfare implications of ownership consolidations in all duopoly and triopoly markets in the 2005 sample. Specifically, I compute the welfare effects for such mergers, and then examine how they vary with market characteristics. In 22 An alternative decomposition is ("reader surplus with pre-merger prices and post-merger characteristics"−"reader surplus with pre-merger prices and pre-merger characteristics") and ("reader surplus with post-merger prices and post-merger characteristics"−"reader surplus with pre-merger prices and post-merger characteristics"). The results are almost identical (-1.38 and -1.89 million dollars).
a duopoly merger, the publisher of one newspaper buys the other and becomes a monopolist in the market. A triopoly merger is defined as one involving the ownership consolidation of the two largest newspapers in a game with three player newspapers. Table 7 . To understand how the welfare effect of a merger varies across markets, I run a regression of the welfare effect on market characteristics. I focus on reader surplus here. Let ∆RS m be the change in average per-household reader surplus in market m. A market in the newspaper industry is characterized by market size, demographics of readers, the set of newspapers, each newspaper's designated market, ownership structure, etc. Since the market structure cannot be captured by simple indices, I regress ∆RS m on a triopoly dummy and endogenous variables that are correlated with the underlying market characteristics. The regression therefore captures a correlation pattern rather than a causal effect. It is a way to summarize the results from the simulations. The impact of ownership consolidation on readers' welfare depends on how much readers in a market value newspapers in general. Obviously, if households in a market do not like reading newspapers, then changes in newspaper characteristics and prices do not affect their welfare much.
The pre-merger newspaper penetration (pen m ), measured by the ratio of the total newspaper circulation to the number of households in market m, is used to capture this aspect of the market.
The negative sign in the estimate is as expected: readers' welfare loss (−∆RS m ) increases when readers care more about newspapers. An increase in the penetration by 1 percentage point is related to an increase in the average welfare loss per household of 42 cents.
Another market feature that affects ∆RS m is the importance of the merging parties' common circulation area to these two newspapers. This influences how strong the cross effect between the two newspapers is. Suppose that two newspapers only compete with each other in a county that is far away from their home counties. This county might not play a large role in generating profit for these two newspapers because of readers' taste for local newspapers. When this is the case, a change in the characteristics of one newspaper does not affect the profit of the other newspaper much and thus the cross effect is weak. Hence, the post-merger adjustment is small. This feature is captured by the pre-merger overlapping rate of the two newspapers under ownership consolidation:
where CT Y 1,2 is the intersection of the markets of the two newspapers, and q 1mc , q 1m and q 2mc , q 2m are county circulation (in county c) and total circulation of the two merging parties. The above regression indicates a negative correlation between ∆RS m and overlap m , meaning that the larger the overlapping area is, the larger is the welfare loss for readers.
The third factor is the pre-merger asymmetry of the two parties to the merger in terms of circulation, measured by log q 1m q 2m
. As explained in Section 5.1, since the marginal benefit of increasing circulation is larger for a larger newspaper, the publisher of the merged parties typically downgrades the larger newspaper by a smaller margin than that of its smaller newspaper. As an adjustment in a larger newspaper has a bigger impact on readers' welfare than the same adjustment in a smaller newspaper, asymmetry matters. Specifically, the larger the asymmetry, the smaller the welfare loss for readers, as indicated by the positive sign in the above regression. Finally, the presence of a competitor mitigates the welfare loss for readers. Therefore, the triopoly dummy has a positive sign in the regression though the estimate is statistically insignificant.
To understand the variation of the bias in the welfare effect when characteristic adjustment is ignored, I run a second regression of the bias on market characteristics. Let ∆∆RS m be the difference between ∆RS m without characteristic adjustment and ∆RS m with characteristic adjustment .
The regression result is as follows:
∆∆RS m = 3.38 + 4.36 triopoly m + 1.64 pen m − 4.04 elas m + m .
(3.58) (2.09) (3.98) (2.35)
Again, the triopoly dummy and the pre-merger penetration matter. For example, the positive coefficient of pen m means that a higher penetration is related to a larger bias in measuring welfare change. Another factor that determines the bias is the demand elasticity with respect to price. This is because the bias is generated by the difference between the post-merger/without-characteristicadjustment equilibrium and the post-merger/with-characteristic-adjustment equilibrium. The bias is therefore the welfare effect of a policy that forces a publisher to set newspaper characteristics back to the pre-merger level. Suppose the pre-merger characteristic of one newspaper is higher. Then, as the publisher increases the characteristic of the newspaper under this policy, it can increase the price. How much it will increase the price depends on the price elasticity of demand. Therefore, in the regression I include the average own elasticity of the two merging newspapers. The negative sign in the regression result implies that a higher price elasticity of demand is related to a smaller bias from ignoring characteristic adjustment.
Conclusion
In this paper, I set up a structural model of the U.S. daily newspaper market and study the Characteristics. Data on average pages per issue is from E &P. It is defined as the weighted sum of average pages per issue for weekdays and that for Sunday with weights ( The data sources and the description of the variables are summarized in Table 8 . 
B Welfare Measures
Reader Surplus
The compensating variation for household i is given by
where α < 0 is the negative of the household's marginal value of income, and V 0 ict −αI i and V 1 ict −αI i are the expected maximum utility for household i with income I i (expectation with respect to the extreme value taste shocks) before and after a merger. Specifically, 23
where U 0 ijct = u 0 ijct − ε ijct is the utility before the merger, net of the extreme value taste shock. The post-merger utility V 1 ict is analogously defined to V 0 ict , replacing U 0 ijct by U 1 ijct and u 0 ijct by u 1 ijct . Given the compensating variation for a specific household above, the change in the average perhousehold reader surplus in county c in year t is given by ∆RS ct = E ζ i (CV ict ). The total welfare change is then the sum of the welfare change in all the counties in a game: ∆RS = ct H ct ∆RS ct , where H ct is the number of households in county c in year t. The change in average per-household reader surplus is ∆RS = ∆RS ct Hct .
Advertiser Surplus
As mentioned in Section 5.1, I only have information to measure the percentage change in advertising surplus. This can be seen as follows. As in Rysman (2004) , suppose a representative advertiser has the following maximization problem:
where a j is the advertising space that the advertiser purchases in newspaper j and A j is the total advertising space in newspaper j. Let m j be the market size of advertising. So, total advertising is
The total advertising space influences the visibility of a specific advertisement. When λ 2 is negative, there exist negative externalities in advertising.
The solution to the advertiser's problem is
The derivation of this expression follows directly from Small and Rosen (1981) for a single discrete choice model.
The only difference is the second and the third terms, the sum of which is the expectation (with respect to the extreme value taste shocks) of the second highest utility. This is the advertising demand function in (7) with η j = η + λ 0 logH j . Plugging it into the advertiser's profit function in (B.1) gives the measure for advertiser surplus
where
is the representative advertiser's demand elasticity with respect to price (see (B.2)).
Since the representative advertiser's price elasticity parameter, λ 3 , and the externality parameter, λ 2 , cannot be identified separately given only aggregate data, I report the percentage change in advertiser surplus.
C Invertibility of the Penetration Function
In this appendix, I show that the invertibility result in BLP can be extended to a multiple discrete choice model. I only show the extension for a model where the number of products that an individual can buy is limited to at most two. The result can be easily extended to a model in which consumers can choose up ton ≤ J products, where J is the total number of products available in a choice set.
Penetration Function
Let Φ (·) represent the distribution function of the random term ς i . The penetration function in Section 2.1 is given by
, is the probability that newspaper j is chosen as the first newspaper (ϑ ij is the deviation of household i's utility from the mean utility), and the probability that newspaper j is chosen as the second newspaper when j is the first best is given by the difference between the followings:
.
Invertibility
Since all statements in this section are true for any given (x, σ, κ), these arguments in s j are omitted for expositional simplicity.
The proof of the invertibility result is slightly different from that in BLP. BLP define a function F : R J → R J pointwise as F j (δ) = δ j + ln s j − ln s j (δ) and show that F is a contraction when an upper bound on the value taken by F is imposed. For a single discrete choice model, the value of
h=1 s h (δ) when δ j = −∞ for ∀j = j is the upper bound of the jth dimension of a fixed point of F . In a multiple discrete choice model, however, this value does not exist when J h=1 s h is larger than 1. 24 I first prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to s j (δ, x; σ, κ) = s j for all j directly without using the function F . I then verify that all conditions in BLP hold so that F is indeed a contraction mapping -when an upper bound is imposed.
The following inequalities, which will be proven at the end of this section, are useful in the proof:
Inequalities (C.5), (C.6) and (C.7) imply that the Jacobian of s has a dominant diagonal.
Therefore, there is a unique solution to the equation system of s j (δ) = s j for all j. 25
I now prove that all conditions in the theorem in BLP hold.
Condition (1): Inequalities (C.4) and (C.6) imply that
Also, inequality (C.7) implies that
Condition (2): Given the monotonicity of F in all dimensions of δ, a lower bound of function
Condition (3): I have already shown that the equation system of s j (δ) = s j has a unique solution. This implies that the mapping F has a unique fixed point. Denote the fixed point by δ * .
Then, F j (δ * ) = δ * j for all j. Note that F j (δ * + ∆) − δ decreasing in ∆ as implied by inequality (C.7). Therefore, F j (δ * + ∆) < δ * j + ∆ for any ∆ > 0. Defineδ j = δ * j + ∆. Then, F j δ <δ j for any j. By inequality (C.6), F j (δ) < δ j for any δ such that δ j =δ j and δ j ≤δ j for all j .
I now show inequalities (C.4) to (C.7). Three observations are important:
Inequalities (C.4) and (C.6) follow directly from the three observations:
To show inequality (C.7), note that J h=1
| ∆=0 , and
Combining inequalities (C.6) and (C.7) yields inequality (C.5).
D Instrumental Variables
The "excluded" instrumental variables that are assumed uncorrelated with the demand error ξ jct :
• BLP-style instrument (IV 1 )
-the number of competitors
• cost shifters (IV 2 , IV 3 , IV 4 )
-frequency of publication -households in the home county of newspaper j (It is correlated with Q jt in the average cost of printing and delivery in (10).)
-households in the home counties of other papers that are close-by and are of the same owner as newspaper j (It is correlated with Q jt in (10).)
• demographics in counties of newspaper j's market (excluding county c) (IV 5 , IV 6 ) -weighted average education and median age (weighted by households in a county)
• demographics in the counties of newspaper j's competitors (excluding counties in j's market) (IV 7 , IV 8 , IV 9 , IV 10 )
-weighted average education, median income, median age and urbanization (weighted by households in a county)
The a The news hole is njt − a rjt, qjt, Hjt;η,λ , whereη andλ are the estimated advertising demand parameters reported in Table 4 .
The instrumental variables that are assumed uncorrelated with the advertising demand error ι jt in (8) include weighted average education, median income as well as median age and urbanization in newspaper j's market (weighted by households in a county).
The instrumental variables that are assumed uncorrelated with the supply-side error terms ζ jt , ω jt , ν kjt in the estimation equations (16), (17) and (18) 
E Details on GMM
To define the GMM objective function, I solve for all error terms and express them as functions of the data and the model parameters. Specifically, ξ jct = δ jct (s ct ; σ, κ) − p jt α − x jt β − x jt z ct θ − y jct ψ − z ct ϕ + (t − t 0 ) ρ (E.8)
ι jt = log a jt − η − λ 0 log H jt − λ 1 log q jt − λ 2 log r jt (E.9)
jt − (γ 1 + γ 2 f jt + γ 3 (x 1jt + a jt ))log(Q jt ) In (E.10), ac (q) jt is solved from the first-order condition with respect to the subscription price (equation (17)). In (E.12), the partial derivative ∂p * j t ∂x kjt is computed following the approach described at the end of Section 2.
These error terms are plugged into the moment conditions that they are uncorrelated with the instrumental variables explained in Appendix D. Let Θ be the collection of all model parameters. Denote the empirical moment conditions by g (Θ). Then, the GMM objective function is g (Θ) W g (Θ), where W is a weighting matrix. I first take the efficient weighting matrix assuming all error terms are homoscedastic to compute an estimate. This estimate is used to obtain a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix, the inverse of which is used as the weighting matrix to obtain another estimate. This process is iterated once more as the estimate does not change much any more from the last iteration. 
